Saturday, December 5, 2009

Fonseka and the National Issues

If Sarath Fonseka doesn’t talk between now and the election he might be OK. When he talks, however, the illusion comes crashing down. Candidate Fonseka talks about his house, his guards, his life. All important to Sarath Fonseka, but I’m not Sarath Fonseka. I have my own problems. I’m concerned about our economy, our security, our lives. Candidate Fonseka speaks to none of those concerns. As far as I can tell, Sarath is running for himself.

Candidate Fonseka

His recent interview with The Sunday Leader was actually shocking in its pettiness. He is basically using all the national attention to complain about losing his perks. A smart candidate could pivot and say that he is now homeless like our IDPs, our dispossessed, that he understands and is with us. Instead Sarath is filing a Fundamental Rights case for his own accommodation.

Indeed, his resignation letter doesn’t read as a national platform as much as list of how Mahinda Rajapaksa has dissed him. That’s fine for a break up letter, but it’s not very inspiring. As it is, he just comes off as selfish and hurt, not a selfless and strong common candidate. I don’t care if he really is in it for himself, but he could at least take the trouble to lie to us.

Subcandidate Ranil

However, another selfish character here is Ranil Wickremesinghe. By clinging onto power he has made this extremely weird situation possible. Ranil choked the UNP so much that they are unable to field a viable candidate for the first time in their history. Then this bruised ego pops out of the Rajapaksa coterie and Ranil thinks he can somehow control him more than Mahinda did. But he can’t.

Ranil looks like a fool claiming the PM spot like it’s some sort of consolation prize. In Sri Lankan politics there is no prize for second place. I think Ranil is a decent and intelligent man, but sometimes such men fail. An honorable man should bow out before taking their whole party down with them.

An Uncommon Candidate

Compared to this selfish behaviour, Mahinda starts to look magnanimous, radiating out from the new 1000 Rupee notes. Indeed, he looks almost humble. At least he shows rather than tells. I’ve been reconsidering him, until another candidate asked for my endorsement. I asked him for a lunch packet and was shocked when he demanded a lunch packet for himself. ‘Mama venuwen mama,’ he said. I for myself.

Malinda Seneviratne is a columnist launching an ‘uncommon candidacy’ for president. He’s running under the mirror symbol and his colour is colorless. He’s running purely for his own interests and promises nothing to develop or uplift the country. He just wants to be on TV for a while and then quit. I think I’m OK with this.

Common Sentiments

I’d find it hard to vote for Sarath right now because he doesn’t seem to have any platform besides the foundation of his house. I can’t vote for Ranil because he won’t even run, or let the UNP field someone else. I find it hard to vote for Mahinda because I fear for the economy, freedom and minority rights, and because six more years of seeing his hoardings might wear a permanent hole in my retina. This leaves me either with the Siddhalepa guy who promised everyone a cow (looking more appealing every day) or maybe this fellow columnist. At the moment I’m leaning towards the uncommon candidate. Now if I could just figure out what the mirror symbol looks like.

An Airport in Hambanthota.

On Friday (27) President Mahinda Rajapaksa laid the foundation stone for a new USD $200 million international airport in Hambantota. The government says that the airport is necessary as a second gateway to Sri Lanka and as an alternate airport for aircraft arriving at Katunayake International Airport, but some aviation professionals see the Hambantota airport as a wasteful political gimmick rather than a well-considered infrastructure project.


This is the third attempt to build a second international airport for the island. The UNP tried to build one in the Kuda Oya area, but lost power before the plans could come to fruition. Then the UPFA administration decided to expand the existing Weerawila airport, only to face stiff resistance from the environmental authority (the airport was close to a bird sanctuary) and opposition from area farmers (the airport would consume rich farm land used for paddy cultivation). Now the airport is scheduled to be constructed in Mattala, which will require clearing 2,000 hectares of natural forest cover and shrub land.


“Flying in Sri Lanka is an absolute nightmare,” said one Sri Lankan pilot, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. “It’s a huge hassle to get to the airport. All the general aviation training has been shifted to small airfields south of Colombo. These airfields are not suitable for training — they do not have adequate runway lights. With all these problems I don’t know why they’re trying to build a 200 million dollar airport. The government should improve the other airfields first.”


A designated alternate airport

According to international regulatory requirements, all airports must have a designated alternate airport in the event that a landing at the original airport is impossible due to bad weather conditions, an obstructed landing strip, or the closure of the airport. Presently, the alternate for Katunayake is Trivandrum Airport in South India, which is around 190 nautical miles and 20 minutes away. Many people do not understand that having an alternate airport close to the original destination, as in the case of Mattala, is not very practical, because the weather at the alternate airport will be similar to the original airport.


Government officials rejected these criticisms, claiming that a second international airport would be good for the aviation industry and for the Southern Province.

“The new airport is necessary for a number of reasons, said Parakrama Dissanayake, Director of Aeronautical Services for the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka. “We don’t have an alternate airstrip for the country. We had an accident in 2004 when a cargo aircraft crashed near Katunayake airport. Had there been another airport the plane wouldn’t have crashed that day. The airport will also facilitate the airline industry because now all airplanes must carry enough fuel to go to an airport in India or Male. So if there’s a closer airport they won’t have to carry so much fuel.”


However, statistics and historical data show that aircraft arriving at Katunayake have diverted on very few occasions due to weather. More often, planes have diverted due to LTTE attacks, which were made possible by the failure of the Sri Lanka Air Force to provide adequate security to the airfield. The poor security resulted in airport closures, including a night curfew.

Language and Politics in Sri Lanka

George Orwell, in his famous essay, ‘Politics and the English Language’ (1946) noted, inter alia, the following:

“In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible.” Poor villages are bombarded from the air and the inhabitants driven out: this is called “pacification.” Peasants are “robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers.” Because, sitting comfortably, one cannot say, “I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so”, one says something like, “While freely conceding that the regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement.” In our age there is no such thing as “keeping out of politics”. All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia. Language, by concealing and misleading, can “corrupt” thought.

The Indian Defence Review report (see, Montage, Colombo, October 2009, pages 27-31) identifies factors that led to victory against the Tamil Tigers. The language used in that and other erudite reports and analyses reminds me of Orwell’s essay. For example, one factor cited in the report as contributing to military success were the steps taken by the government to “regulate” (sic) the media so as to ensure “a unidirectional flow of conflict information” (sic). This translates into plain English as media censorship and state propaganda, that is, into both suppression and falsification. The admired “Go to hell” attitude adopted by the government of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis foreign governments and humanitarian organisations means that humanitarian considerations and compassion were rejected. Innocent, trapped and petrified children, women and men were made to pay an appalling price in the unnecessary haste to ‘finish the job’: “wade through slaughter” to victory and power, and “shut the gates of mercy on mankind” (Thomas Gray).

Secondly, from incorrect questions one cannot arrive at correct answers but I would draw attention to a question not asked by the Review or by anyone else. Allow me to quote from ‘A “great” military victory?’ published by you recently (Sunday Leader, 25 October 2009).

It is thought that, at their height, the Tigers perhaps numbered 30,000. Towards the end, down to a few thousand (finally, a few hundred), they faced an army of (again, perhaps) 250,000. The Tigers did not have jets and helicopters. Their mono, propeller, planes were slow and clumsy, and of no real military value. Rejected by foreign governments, the Tigers were as isolated internationally as they were totally surrounded in geographic and military terms. In contrast, the government of Sri Lanka received help and advice from several countries, even from those states in competition with, and suspicious of, each other. The Taliban fight in mountainous, inaccessible, terrain, while the Tigers occupied flat land, albeit forested. Sri Lanka being an island (and the government of the nearest country, India, implacably hostile), the LTTE did not have borders over which they could easily slip, regroup, recover and return to continue the struggle. The wonder is not that the government eventually won but that it took so long for final victory to be achieved.

The last should surely be investigated: given the above facts, why did victory take so long? The answer will point to shameful elements, such as money made through war, including lucrative commissions on the purchase of weaponry (at times, of poor quality and / or of little use); political corruption, nepotism and military incompetence; covert political compromise and secret “horse trading”; foreign governments playing roles which changed in Machiavellian fashion (or, if one prefers an Eastern text, in the spirit of Kautilya’s treatise on government, Arthashastra) according to their perceived interests, and so on. Most damningly, those in political power, as well as those in military command, were indifferent to the injury and death suffered by rank-and-file soldiers, drawn largely from the rural poor and the working class. (See, Elmo Jayawardena’s poignant, Sam’s Story.) Wounded, traumatized and disabled soldiers were not adequately cared for; close relations (wife and children; parents) of those killed not financially sustained. These last help to explain why recruitment was then difficult; why, for long, morale was low, and the rate of desertion embarrassingly high; why, at times, the Tigers were able to equip themselves with weapons abandoned by fleeing troops. Of course, as already indicated, another factor that contributed to the prolongation of the war was that the Tigers, granted their ethical failures and political failings (both several and of a grievous nature) did fight with exceptional courage and tenacity. Mr Christopher Rezel (Sri Lankan writer and journalist, now in Australia) in a recent message to me, points this out:

“Be that as it may, the LTTE leader must have had (a) brave and (b) brilliant men and women. Otherwise, those daring and successful military victories could never have been achieved – and there were many such battle-victories against unbelievable odds and circumstances. As for (b) above, consider the building of an air force and submarines, however rudimentary; the construction of airstrips and ports. Given time, they may have even got guided missiles up in the air!”

But to take up, discuss or argue this aspect here would distract from the present focus.

It is well to bask in the glow of victory (and exploit it for maximum political mileage), but if corruption is to be reduced, an honest examination of the conduct of the war over the last thirty years or more should be undertaken. Uncomfortable questions must not be swept under the carpet. In the long-term interests of the Island and its well-being, not only the reasons for victory, but why a totally unequal conflict prolonged itself for so long should also be confronted and investigated. The people are entitled to, and deserve, the truth, the total truth.

The laurel crown of victory must not be allowed to serve also as the proverbial fig-leaf that hides embarrassment and shame.

Charles Sarvan (from The Sunday Leader)